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REAFFIRMING REALIST ANALYSIS UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, BARRINGER v.
GRIFFES, 1 F.3d 1331 (2d Cir. 1993)
The Framers of the Constitution created the Commerce Clause'
to ensure an open national economy.2 States may regulate or tax
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause3 so long as those
regulations or taxes do not unreasonably burden the flow of inter-
state commerce.4 Virtually every state taxes goods as they flow
1. "The Congress shall have power.., to regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITULTONAL LAW 404 (2d ed. 1988)
(citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41, 42 (James Madison); 3 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 547).
3. Beginning with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851),
the Supreme Court found that, in addition to making federal regulation of interstate
commerce superior to conflicting state regulations, the Commerce Clause imposes a
negative limit on states' power to regulate interstate commerce. In Cooley, the
Court established that states could regulate aspects of interstate commerce that were
predominantly local in nature. Id. at 321. See generally TRIBE, supra note 2, at 406-
08 (discussing the Cooley doctrine). In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250 (1938), the Supreme Court clearly conferred to states the authority to
tax interstate commerce, stating that "It was not the purpose of the commerce clause
to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax
burden even though [the tax] increases the cost of doing the business." Id. at 254.
4. The Supreme Court reiterated its policy regarding state taxation of interstate
commerce in Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The
Court stated the principle behind the policy as "follow[ing] inexorably from the ba-
sic purpose of the Clause. Permitting the individual States to enact laws that favor
local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state businesses 'would invite a multiplica-
tion of preferential trade areas destructive' of the free trade which the Clause pro-
tects." Id. at 329 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)).
Discussing a New York tax on stock transfers, the Court stated: "While it is true
that, absent an undue burden on interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause does
not prohibit the States from taxing the transfer of property within the state, the tax
may not discriminate on the basis of some interstate element." Id. at 332 n.12 (citing
International Harvester v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1944)).
The Court simplified this rule in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642, reh'g
denied, 469 U.S. 912 (1984). "[A] state may not tax a transaction or incident more
heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the state." Id.
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through its borders.5 These states employ a system of sales and
compensating use taxes.6 The Supreme Court finds state use taxes
unconstitutional when the taxes impose a burden on interstate com-
merce rather than promote interstate equality.7 To avoid burdening
interstate commerce, state legislatures often provide consumers with
credits for sales and use taxes paid to other states on the same
goods.8 Currently, the Supreme Court does not explicitly require
5. All states except Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon
impose general state sales and use taxes. State Tax Guide (CCH) 60-100 (Aug.
1993).
6. A "use tax" is defined as:
A tax on the use, consumption, or storage of tangible property, usually at the
same rate as the sales tax, and levied for the purpose of preventing tax avoid-
ance by the purchase of articles in a state or taxing jurisdiction which does not
levy sales taxes or has a lower rate.
BLACK'S LAw DICTnONARY 1543 (6th ed. 1990).
The Supreme Court approved compensating use taxes in Henneford v. Silas Ma-
son Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937). "Things acquired or transported in interstate
commerce may be subjected to a property tax, nondiscriminatory in its operation,
when they have become part of the common mass of property within the state of
destination." Id.
States originally employed compensating use taxes in the 1930s to ensure that
consumers did not purchase goods in other states to avoid paying their home state's
sales tax. Walter Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional
State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405,407 (1986) [hereinafter Complementary
Taxes]. Because virtually every state now employs a general sales tax, this justifica-
tion for use taxes carries less weight. Many states, however, impose special sales and
use taxes on certain goods and services. See Lori A. Burkhart, State Taxes and the
Commerce Clause: Recent Rulings, 126 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 44 (1990) (discussing state
sales and use taxes effecting utilities); Jerome R. Hellerstein, Significant Sales and
Use Tax Developments During the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L. Rlv. 961 (1986)
(discussing problems raised by new state taxes).
7. See, e.g., Haliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, reh'g de-
nied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963) (invalidating Louisiana use tax that discriminated against
interstate commerce because different rates applied to different parts of the produc-
tion process for out-of-state and in-state manufacturers, thus subjecting out-of-state
manufacturers to a higher tax). The Haliburton Court concluded that "equal treat-
ment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition prece-
dent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state." Id. at 70.
8. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); State Tax Guide
(CCH) 60-100 (Aug. 1993) (indicating that most states provide such credits).
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kan-
sas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington have adopted the Multistate Tax Com-
pact as of April, 1992. State Tax Guide (CCH) 351 (Apr. 1992). The Compact
provides that "[e]ach purchaser liable for a use tax on tangible personal property
shall be entitled to full credit for the combined amount or amounts of legally im-
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states to provide credits,9 but the Court encourages the use of cred-
its because they prevent multiple taxation on interstate commerce.10
In Barringer v. Griffes," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Vermont's Motor Vehicle Sales and Use Tax, 2 which taxed a
vehicle's use of the highways without allowing a credit for taxes paid
in other states, violated the Commerce Clause. 3
The Barringers, Connecticut residents, purchased an automobile
in 1988 and paid Connecticut's sales tax on the purchase price. 4 In
1990, the Barringers moved to Vermont and discovered that Ver-
mont law15 required them to pay an additional tax assessed at a rate
of four percent of their car's depreciated value.' 6 The Barringers
posed sales or use taxes paid by him with respect to the same property to another
state and any subdivision thereof." Mo. REv. STAT. § 32.200, art. V, § 1 (1986).
9. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985) (avoiding issue of whether recip-
rocal tax credits are mandatory). See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Court's current doctrine regarding credits.
10. See, e.g., Henneford, 300 U.S at 587. This concern underlies the internal con-
sistency test. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
internal consistency test.
11. 1 F.3d 1331 (2d Cir. 1993).
12. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8903 (Supp. 1992). See infra note 15 for the text of
the statute.
13. Barringer, 1 F.3d at 1338-39.
14. Id. at 1332. The Barringers purchased a 1988 Mazda for $14,769. Connecti-
cut levied its sales tax at a rate of 7.5% of the purchase price of the car, equalling
$1,085. Id.
15. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8903 (Supp. 1992) provides:
(b) There is hereby imposed upon the use within this state a tax of five percent
of the taxable cost of any pleasure car... [payable] by a person at the time of
first registering or transferring a registration to such motor vehicle payable as
hereinafter provided, except no tax shall be payable hereunder if the tax im-
posed by subsection (a) above has been paid ... Subsection (a) establishes a
tax "upon the purchase in Vermont of a motor vehicle by a resident a tax at the
time of such purchase, payable as hereinafter provided. The amount of the tax
shall be five percent of the taxable cost of any pleasure car... "
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8903(a) (Supp. 1992). The Barringers were subject to the
earlier form of this statute, which imposed a 4% tax. Barringer, 1 F.3d at 1333.
16. The statute applies to "taxable cost." That amount is "not to exceed the
average book value of the same make, type, model and year of manufacture as des-
ignated by the manufacturer and as shown in the official used car guide, National
Automobile Dealers Association ...." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8902(5)(B) (Supp.
1992). The Vermont Tax Commissioner required the Barringers to pay $280 in
taxes; 4% of the depreciated value of the automobile. Barringer, 1 F.3d at 1333.
1994]
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asked the United States District Court for the District of Vermont 17
to find that Vermont's motor vehicle use tax violated the United
States Constitution.'" The district court 9 held that the tax did not
violate the Commerce Clause because it taxed only use within Ver-
mont.20 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that Vermont unfairly apportioned the tax by not providing
a credit for taxes on the vehicle already paid to other states.21
The plaintiffs objected to the use tax because Vermont failed to grant them a
credit for the Connecticut sales tax already paid on the automobile, similar to that
given to residents who paid Vermont sales tax. Id.
17. Barringer v. Griffes, 801 F. Supp. 1282, 1283 (1992), rev'd, 1 F.3d 1331 (2d
Cir. 1993).
18. Other individuals have challenged the constitutionality of the Vermont Mo-
tor Vehicle Use Tax. See, e.g., Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985). See infra
notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
19. The procedural history of this case typifies the hurdles consumers face when
challenging state taxes. The Barringers initially sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in Vermont Superior Court. 1 F.3d at 1333. Michael Griffes, the Motor Vehi-
cle Commissioner and defendant in this case, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the Barringers failed to pay the tax. Id. The
Barringers then withdrew their state claim and refiled it in the Federal District
Court for the District of Vermont under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 801 F. Supp. at
1283. The Supreme Court permits taxpayers to recover § 1983 damages against
states that tax them in violation of their constitutional rights. Walter Hellerstein,
Supreme Court Settles Some State Tax Issues While Creating Other Problems, 75 J.
TAX'N 180, 183-85 (1991). The district court, however, dismissed the Barringers'
case, finding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1988). 801 F. Supp. at 1283.
On appeal from that decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that "if
there is a judicial remedy available to the Barringers in Vermont, it cannot fairly be
said to be plain." Barringer v. Griffes, 964 F.2d 1278, 1284 (2d Cir. 1992). The court
concluded that in light of earlier litigation concerning the Motor Vehicle Purchase
and Use Tax in Williams, 472 U.S. 14 (1985), "a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy"
could not be had as required by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
Barringer, 964 F.2d at 1279-80. However, the court vacated the district court's find-
ing of lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at
1284.
20. 801 F. Supp. at 1286. The court held that:
Vermont's motor vehicle purchase and use tax does not tax interstate activity at
all. The tax, calculated as a percentage of the "taxable cost" or depreciated
value of the vehicle at the time of registration in Vermont, is on the use of the
car in Vermont only, not in any other state.
Id.
21. 1 F.3d at 1339.
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The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce. 2 In addition, the Commerce Clause limits the
states' power to regulate or tax interstate commerce, even when no
superseding federal regulation exists. 3 Since the Supreme Court
first announced this principle in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court has treated state regulations and state taxes affecting
interstate commerce separately.24 Historically, the Court used a for-
malist analysis when considering challenges to state taxation. Under
the formalist analysis, the Court focused on whether a tax applied to
a forbidden subject, not whether the tax had a forbidden effect.'
In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,26 the Court first approved use
taxes on goods brought into the state that had not been subject to
greater or equal sales tax in another state.27 The Court upheld the
use tax after applying the formalist analysis because the tax applied
to use of goods, not commercial transactions, and because the tax
tended to foster interstate equality. 8
In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 9 the Supreme Court over-
ruled the formalist approach and upheld a Mississippi tax levied on
an interstate business's gross receipts from operations within the
22. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
23. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959).
It has long been established doctrine that the Commerce Clause gives exclusive
power to the Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and its failure to act on
the subject in the area of taxation nevertheless requires that interstate com-
merce shall be free from any direct restrictions or impositions by the States.
Id. at 458 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
24. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 441. "Although decisions concerning the constitu-
tional validity of state taxes affecting interstate commerce can be assessed in terms
of an interest-balancing process similar to that employed in the judicial evaluation of
state regulation, the Supreme Court has not usually organized its analysis in terms of
such balancing." Id.
25. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 441-42 (describing the Court's formalist analysis
under Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), which held that a state
could tax the privilege of doing business).
26. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
27. Id. at 584. "When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject
to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the
gates." Id.
28. Id.
29. 430 U.S. 274, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977).
1994]
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state.3 ° In response to the taxpayer's Commerce Clause challenge,
the Court developed a four part test to analyze state taxes.31 Under
Complete Auto Transit, states: 1) may only tax activities with a
"substantial nexus" to the taxing state;32 2) must apportion the tax
fairly; 3) may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4)
may only tax in fair relation to the services provided.33 In Complete
Auto Transit, the Court allowed states to tax formerly forbidden
subjects, thus expanding the realm of permissible state taxation.34
In addition, the Court provided a framework to analyze state taxes
which allegedly violate the Commerce Clause.35
30. Id. at 289 (overruling Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951)). The Court justified overruling its own precedent by stating that:
There is no economic consequence that follows necessarily from the use of the
particular words, "privilege of doing business," and a focus on that formalism
merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect. Sim-
ply put, the Spector rule does not address the problems with which the Com-
merce Clause is concerned.
Id. at 288-89 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 279.
32. Id. In addition to the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause limits state
taxing power to objects or events that meet what are essentially jurisdictional re-
quirements. In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., the Court denied a due
process challenge to a state's tax which impacted taxes on certain components of a
foreign corporation's net income by saying that the tax only applied to income
"which arises from its activities within the taxing state." 358 U.S. at 464. See also
Developments in the Law - Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Busi-
ness, 75 HARV. L. Rnv. 953, 961 (1962) (describing Fourteenth Amendment limits
on state taxation) [hereinafter Developments].
33. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279. The Court derived this test primarily
from Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959),
which held that a state may tax the net income of a multi-state business provided the
state properly apportioned the tax. Id. at 464-65.
34. Since 1977, the Supreme Court has applied the Complete Auto Transit test to
uphold several state taxes. See, e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S.
24 (1988) (permitting state use tax on mail order catalogs); Wardair Canada, Inc. v.
Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986) (upholding state tax on aviation fuel);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (upholding mineral severance
tax), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981); Department of Revenue of Wash. v. Associa-
tion of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978) (upholding state business and
occupation tax). For an analysis of one court's application of the Complete Auto
Transit test, see Neil M. Robinson, Note, Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1987
Term - Complete Auto Transit Test Applied to State Use Tax: D. H. Holmes Co. v.
McNamara, 42 TAx LAW. 391 (1989).
35. See Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an
Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 138
(1988) [hereinafter State Taxation] (describing the controversy over whether states
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In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 6 the
Supreme Court developed the internal consistency test to evaluate
the Complete Auto Transit test's second prong.37 The internal con-
sistency test requires the Court to hypothesize the impact on inter-
state commerce if all jurisdictions adopted similarly apportioned
taxes. 38 This approach identifies state taxes which are not in pro-
portion to a person's or business's activities in the state.3 9 The test
also eliminates any requirement that the taxpayer show actual multi-
ple taxation.4" While the test originated in the context of apportion-
must, in all cases, provide a credit to taxpayers for sales or use taxes paid to other
states).
36. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
37. See id. at 162 (upholding California's business income tax apportionment
formula as applied to a corporation with foreign subsidiaries). The Court an-
nounced that internal consistency guides evaluation of apportionment formulas. See
id. at 169 (explaining that "the formula must be such that, if applied by every juris-
diction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business's income being
taxed").
38. Id. The Supreme Court has applied the Container Corp. internal consistency
test to a wide range of state taxes. In Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984),
the Court rebuffed the state's argument that the plaintiff must show actual discrimi-
nation. The Court held that:
[T]his is not the test. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,
... the Court noted that a tax must have "what might be called internal consis-
tency-that is the [tax] must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction," there
would be no impermissible interference with free trade.
Id. at 644. The Court interpreted Container Corp. to encompass a broad range of
taxes, and then announced that "[a] tax that unfairly apportions income from other
States is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce." Id
The Court redefined the internal consistency test in a case involving a tax on inter-
state telephone calls. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989) (holding that
"[tlo be internally consistent, a tax must be structured so that if every State were to
impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result"). See also American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (invalidating Pennsylvania's
unapportioned taxes on interstate trucks); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington
State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987) (applying Complete Auto Transit's
fourth factor, discrimination against interstate commerce).
39. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169-71.
40. In Armco, the Court rejected West Virginia's assertion that the plaintiff must
show actual discrimination. 467 U.S. at 644-45. The Court applied the internal con-
sistency test because "[a]ny other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West
Virginia's tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49
other States.. . ." Id.
1994]
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ing an income tax on a unitary business, the Court now evaluates a
variety of taxes using the internal consistency test.4 1
After the development of the internal consistency test in Com-
plete Auto Transit, the Supreme Court decided whether a state may
tax property use within its jurisdiction. In Maryland v. Louisiana42
the Court struck down Louisiana's "first use" tax on outer continen-
tal shelf natural gas.43 The Court found the statute unconstitutional
because its system of credits discriminated against out-of-state con-
sumers, despite statutory language suggesting that the tax promoted
equality.44
While the Supreme Court acknowledges that states may tax prop-
erty use provided the tax meets constitutional requirements,45 the
Court has not mandated specific steps for states to meet these re-
quirements. 6 In Williams v. Vermont,47 the Court invalidated part
of the Vermont Motor Vehicle Purchase and Use Tax48 because it
violated the Equal Protection Clause.49 The Court discussed, but
41. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1988) (holding that Illinois's ex-
cise tax on interstate telephone calls was internally consistent); American Trucking
Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (invalidating Pennsylvania's lump sum an-
nual tax on operating trucks in the state because that tax failed the internal consis-
tency test). Some critics find this test unnecessary to evaluate "unapportioned
levies" which would be invalid "under a straightforward application of the venerable
fair apportionment requirement." See State Taxation, supra note 35, at 188.
42. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
43. Id. at 760.
44. "The common thread running through the cases upholding compensatory
taxes is the equality of treatment between local and interstate commerce.... How-
ever, the pattern of credits and exemptions.., undeniably violates this principle of
equality." Id. at 759.
45. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text for a description of these
requirements.
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (up-
holding Montana's controversial severance tax on low sulphur coal). The Court
stated that "the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legis-
lative, and not judicial, resolution." Id. at 628 (footnote omitted).
47. 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8911(9) (Supp. 1992).
49. 472 U.S. at 27. In Williams, individuals who were new Vermont residents
challenged a provision of the tax which allowed Vermont residents, but not those
moving into Vermont, to receive a credit on sales taxes paid to other states where
they had previously registered their vehicle. Id. at 16. The Supreme Court ruled
that this provision violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the Court
found "no relevant difference between motor vehicle registrants who purchased
their cars out-of-state while they were Vermont residents and those who only came
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/11
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did not decide, whether a state must provide credits for sales or use
taxes paid to other states.50 The Court noted strong support from
lower courts and commentators for requiring states to provide cred-
its,51 but declined to rule on the issue because there was another
clear ground for invalidating the tax.52 Thus, the Court in Williams
did not decide whether states must offer credits for sales or use
taxes paid to other states.
Absent Supreme Court precedent requiring credits, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Tax Commis-
sion,53 found the state's severance tax on natural gas fairly appor-
tioned.54 The court found no apportionment problem because only
one state, Oklahoma, even had the power to tax the severance of
gas.55 Other courts have applied similar logic to the fair apportion-
ment issue to conclude that no apportionment problem can arise
when a state taxes an event unique to the state.5
6
to Vermont after buying a car elsewhere." Id. at 27. See generally PAUL HARTMAN,
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 1010 (1981 & Supp.
1992).
50. 472 U.S. at 21-22.
51. Id. at 22. The Court cited Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 78 Cal. Rptr. 373, 391 (1969) (requiring a credit to avoid imposing a discrimina-
tory burden on interstate commerce), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970);
Developments, supra note 32, at 999-1000 (arguing that use taxes are invalid absent a
credit); STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE COMMIT-
TEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP. No. 565,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1965) (finding that credits prevent unfair burdening of
interstate commerce). See also MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, art. V, § 1 (reprinted in
State Tax Guide (CCH) 1 351 (Apr. 1992)) (requiring member states to credit sales
and use taxes paid to other states); State Taxation, supra note 35, at 160-61 (finding
that the Supreme Court resolved the credit issue by adopting the internal consis-
tency test).
52. Williams, 472 U.S. at 22. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577,
587 (1937) (stating that "[W]e have not meant to imply by anything said in this
opinion that allowance of a credit for other taxes paid to Washington made it
mandatory that there should be a like allowance for taxes paid to other states.").
See also D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 31 (1988) (finding a Louisi-
ana taxing scheme fairly apportioned "for it provides a credit...
53. 774 P.2d 468 (Okla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 854 (1989).
54. Id. at 473-74.
55. Id. at 473.
56. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Department of Revenue, 773 P.2d 1176
(Mont.) (finding no potential for multiple taxation where the state levied tax on
transmitting power within the state), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1050 (1989); Exxon Corp.
v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 783 P.2d 685 (Wyo. 1989) (holding tax fairly
1994]
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In Cole Bros. Circus, Inc. v. Huddleston,57 the Tennessee Court of
Appeals upheld a state use tax as applied to the property of an itin-
erant circus. 8 The tax provided a credit for taxes paid to other
states on the same property; therefore, the court felt no apportion-
ment problem existed. 9 Cole Bros. Circus typifies a line of cases
finding that there is no apportionment problem when a state pro-
vides a credit for similar taxes paid to other states.60 However,
those courts did not interpret the Commerce Clause as requiring
states to provide sales tax credits to fairly apportion their taxes.61
apportioned when applied only to pipe installed and used in state), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 910 (1990).
At least one state supreme court misread Supreme Court precedent. See Great
Am. Airways v. Nevada State Tax Comm'n, 705 P.2d 654, 657 (Nev. 1985) (holding
that "We need not address [plaintiff's] concern that Nevada's taxing scheme may
result in multiple taxation because [plaintiff's] failure to demonstrate actual multiple
taxation is fatal to its assignment of error."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986). See
supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's
application of the internal consistency test.
57. No. 01-A-01-9301-CH00004, 1993 WL 190914 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 1993).
58. Id. at *8.
59. Id. at *6. "Cole Bros.' argument in regard to apportionment of the use tax is
likewise without merit. Tennessee law allows a credit against Tennessee tax liability
for sales or use tax paid to another state.... In fact, the evidence is that Cole Bros.
has been given credit for taxes paid in other states." Id.
60. See also Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Marx, 594 So.2d 615, 618 (Miss. 1992)
(concluding that because the state provided a credit, the use tax met the internal
consistency requirement and the fair apportionment test); C & P Tel. v. Comptroller,
561 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Md. 1989) (stating that "We also find the Maryland use tax...
fairly apportioned, for it provides a credit against the use tax for sales taxes that
have been paid in other states."); H.K. Porter Co. v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 169,
171 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (upholding use tax on purchase of corporate aircraft as
fairly apportioned because it provides a credit).
61. At least two courts elected to use a detailed balancing approach to state
taxes. In Associated Ind. of Mo. v. Director of Revenue, No. 75089, 1993 WL
229402 (Mo. June 30,1993), the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a state-wide use tax
which may tax out-of-state goods at a higher rate in some areas due to varied local
taxes. Id. at *10. The court found the tax was so low as to "not discriminate against
interstate commerce in purpose or practical effect." Id. In Consolidated Freight-
ways v. Department of Revenue, 477 N.W.2d 44 (Wis. 1991), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld a statute employing an apportionment formula that resulted in a 1.1%
increase in the tax rate on a multistate business for a period of years. Id. at 51. The
court approved the apportionment formula because it was a rough but reasonable
approximation of the company's activities in the state. Id.
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In Barringer v. Griffes,62 the Second Circuit found that the Ver-
mont Motor Vehicle Purchase and Use Tax63 failed to meet Com-
plete Auto Transit's fair apportionment criterion because it did not
provide a credit for sales taxes paid to other states.64 The parties
agreed that if the tax violated the Commerce Clause, it did so by
failing to meet either the fair apportionment or discrimination
prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test.65 The court held the tax
unfairly apportioned, rendering its analysis of the discrimination is-
sue moot.66
The court held that the fair apportionment prong requires a tax be
fairly attributable to the taxed activity.67 The court assailed the dis-
trict court's conclusion that Vermont fairly apportioned the tax.68
Instead, the court found that by apportioning the tax in relation to
the value of the automobile, Vermont violated the Commerce
Clause.69 To determine if Vermont fairly apportioned the tax, the
court applied the internal consistency test.7 The court found the
tax internally inconsistent7' and thus unfairly apportioned because
62. 1 F.3d 1331 (2d Cir. 1993).
63. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8903 (Supp. 1992). For the text of this statute, see
supra note 15.
64. 1 F.3d at 1337.
65. Id. at 1335. The plaintiffs argued that the tax failed the fair apportionment
test because "during the useful life of a vehicle transported interstate, it will be taxed
more than a vehicle that remains instate." Id.
66. "While we need not decide this issue, we address it to highlight the negative
effects of the tax." Id. at 1337. The court concluded that the tax discriminated be-
cause it "provid[ed] an advantage to local producers whose products effectively will
cost less and make out-of-state purchases disadvantageous." Id. at 1337-38 (citing
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988)).
67. 1 F.3d at 1335. The court stated the issue as "whether [the] tax is fairly at-
tributable to an activity carried on in the taxing state." Id. (citing Walter Heller-
stein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of
Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 57 (1987)).
68. 1 F.3d at 1335.
69. The court stated that "[t]he perplexing question underlying this case-and
for that matter all use tax cases---concerns the precise circumstances under which it
will be fair for Vermont to apportion a tax on goods transported into the state based
on the value of the goods." Id. at 1335-36.
70. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). See
supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Container Corp. and
the internal consistency test.
71. 1 F.3d at 1337. The court used the internal consistency definition from
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989). See supra note 38 for the Goldberg
definition.
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the Vermont tax subjected automobiles like the Barringers' to multi-
ple taxation without regard to actual use in the state.72
While the Supreme Court failed to find sales tax credits constitu-
tionally required,73 the court in Barringer noted that such credits
may enable a tax to meet Commerce Clause requirements. 74 Like
the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit refused to decide that the
Commerce Clause requires a credit.75 The court found that because
the Vermont tax subjected automobiles to multiple taxation,76 the
tax "heavily burden[ed]" interstate commerce, but still refused to
require Vermont to provide credits. 7 While remarking that a credit
would certainly cure the defect, the court declared that Vermont's
legislature, not the court, must choose how to apportion the tax
fairly.78
Judge Van Graafeiland dissented,79 contending that because the
Vermont Legislature intended to tax automobile use to pay for up-
keep of highways within the state,8° no multiple taxation could re-
72. 1 F.3d at 1337. The court found that even if Vermont taxed depreciated
value rather than purchase price, the tax still would constitute impermissible multi-
ple taxation. Id.
73. The Court stated:
Although plaintiffs ask us to hold that a credit is affirmatively required if the
statute is to be ruled constitutional, we decline this invitation to rechart our
course because to adopt their suggestion would take us further from shore and
give our holding a broader reach than necessary to decide this appeal.
Id.
74. Id at 1336 (citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,265 (1989); D.H. Holmes
Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24,31 (1988); Ilyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington
State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,248-49 (1987); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U.S. 577, 587 (1937)).
75. Id at 1337.
76. The court gave an example comparing the taxes paid on two $10,000 cars,
one bought in Vermont and the other bought out of state. The court concluded that
"multiple taxation [of the interstate auto] still results ... even when the use tax only
taxes the auto's depreciated value," because that car's owner must pay more tax. 1
F.3d at 1337.
77. Id. at 1337. "Applying the [internal consistency] test demonstrates that if all
the states employed Vermont's tax plan, an automobile registered in several states
during its useful life would be taxed considerably more than a vehicle that spent its
entire life in the same state." Id.
78. Id.
79. 1 F.3d at 1339 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
80. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8901 (Supp. 1992) (stating the purpose
underlying the Motor Vehicle Purchase and Use Tax).
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suit.81 He argued that the Vermont tax did not raise an
apportionment issue because only Vermont may tax this use.82
Judge Van Graafeiland claimed, furthermore, that the majority im-
properly examined the method the state legislature chose to deter-
mine the tax rate.8
3
The Barringer majority correctly applied the Supreme Court's
current Commerce Clause doctrine.' Recent developments in the
Supreme Court's treatment of state taxation suggest a definite shift
toward a realist analysis, 85 exemplified by Complete Auto Transit's
internal consistency test.86 The court's method complied with recent
Supreme Court state taxation decisions indicating that the Court
now prefers to focus on a tax's actual impact rather than on the
state's articulated purpose.' The Barringer court evaluated Ver-
mont's tax using the internal consistency test 88 rather than examin-
ing the Vermont Legislature's stated purpose for the tax, and
thereby advanced the realist approach to state taxation.
81. 1 F.3d at 1340 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
82. The majority and the dissent interpret apportionment differently. Judge Van
Graafeiland defined the issue as whether the tax could possibly be levied by more
than one state. Id. at 1340. The majority, however, focused the apportionment issue
on whether the tax amount properly related to the taxpayer's activities in the taxing
state. Id. at 1335.
83. 1 F.3d at 1340 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). To support this proposition,
Judge Van Graafeiland cited a footnote in Williams that contained a scathing deri-
sion of Vermont's choice to apportion the tax according to the automobile's value.
A nonrecurring use tax pegged to the value of the car is an exceedingly loosely
tailored means to this end. The amount of such a payment has no relation to
the extent of use, includes the irrelevant variable of the luxury value of the car,
and fails to account for the possibility of the owner moving out of the State or
selling the car during its useful life. Reliance on annual registration fees would
provide a more accurate measure of current use and would seem to be more
closely related to the stated purpose. However, appellants do not challenge the
tax itself as an equal protection violation.
Williams, 472 U.S. at 25 n.9.
84. See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
current doctrine.
85. In state taxation cases, the Supreme Court focuses on evaluating the tax's
actual impact rather than its purpose. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the cases which developed this realist analysis.
86. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 441. See generally Complementary Taxes, supra
note 6 (discussing the purpose of compensating use taxes in the 1930s).
87. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases focus-
ing on a tax's actual impact.
88. Barringer, 1 F.3d at 1337.
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Judge Van Graafeiland's dissent in Barringer followed an out-
dated analysis of state taxation by focusing on Vermont's articulated
purpose for the tax.89 Judge Van Graafeiland quickly concluded
that the tax could not .burden interstate commerce because it only
applied to highway use in Vermont, ignoring the tax's potential for
discrimination.90 He attacked the majority position by applying the
standard of review applied to equal protection questions.91 Judge
Van Graafeiland also mistakenly argued that the majority misap-
plied the internal consistency test, which he believed only applies in
the unitary business area. 2 Judge Van Graafeiland's problematic
reasoning perpetuates an outmoded approach to state taxation of
interstate commerce.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, the Second Cir-
cuit's approach may have been the only way to prevent Vermont's
continued discrimination. In Williams, the Supreme Court avoided
the issue presented in Barringer because an egregious violation of
the Equal Protection Clause allowed them to resolve the case. 93
This fact, along with the Supreme Court's earlier comments about
Vermont's tax,94 strongly suggest that the Supreme Court may agree
vith the Barringer majority.
With states increasingly expected to pay a larger share of govern-
ment-mandated programs, the reasons underlying the Commerce
Clause remain compelling. Courts must take steps to insure that
states do not tax interstate commerce or goods moving through the
state as a means of erecting trade barriers and improperly fostering
home state business. Allowing states to tax interstate goods for such
purposes would encourage enhanced competition between states,
89. Id. at 1341 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1340 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
91. Id. Judge Van Graafeiland cited a note in Williams that referred to the "rea-
sonable basis" standard for reviewing classifications challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause. Williams, 472 U.S. at 25 n.9.
92. 1 F.3d at 1339 (Van Graafeiland, 3., dissenting) (citing Tinova Corp. v. Mich-
igan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 (1991); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue
of Wis., 447 U.S. 207, 229 (1980)). However, the test applies to a broad range of
taxes. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of these taxes.
93. "Once again, however, we find it unnecessary to reach this question.
Whatever the general rule may be, to provide a credit only to those who were resi-
dents at the time they paid the sales tax to another State is an arbitrary distinction
that violates the Equal Protection Clause." 472 U.S. at 22.
94. See supra note 83 for the Supreme Court's discussion of the Vermont tax.
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while ignoring an international economic imperative that the United
States become more competitive.
The Second Circuit reasonably extended current Supreme Court
doctrine95 by ruling that a tax which subjects property to multiple
taxation for no other reason than that it came from another state
violates the principles of the Commerce Clause. The Second Circuit
carefully navigated the Commerce Clause doctrine's murky waters
to successfully retain the best attributes of the emerging realist anal-
ysis. 6 If the Supreme Court follows the path the Barringer majority
laid and mandates that states provide a credit to payers of that
state's use taxes for all sales and use taxes paid to other states, it
would resolve at least one nagging problem with the current, confus-
ing state taxation doctrine. 7
Ian H. Morrison*
95. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Com-
plete Auto Transit test.
96. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's realist approach to state taxation, exemplified by the internal con-
sistency test.
97. Complementary Taxes, supra note 6, at 430.
* J.D. 1995, Washington University.
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